Subject:
SUO: Physical and Abstract (was Lifecycle Integration Schema
From:
"John F. Sowa" <sowa@bestweb.net>
Date:
Tue, 30 Sep 2003 13:58:37 -0400
To:
Jon Awbrey <jawbrey@att.net>
CC:
SUO <standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org>, Matthew West <matthew.west@shell.com>, cg@cs.uah.edu, Nicola Guarino <guarino@loa-cnr.it>


Jon,

When you ask the question that way, you can't
get an answer:

JA: So where have we got?  As usual exactly nowhere.

    | What is the operational test of the distinction
    | between abstract things and non-abstract things?

JA: Until I get some reason to believe otherwise, I must
    now conclude that the supposed distinction is almost
    purely a matter of personal or regional taste, about
    which no further dispute can serve any actual purpose.

I call the categories Physical and Abstract.  There
are several clear criteria for being physical:

 1. Can you see it, feel it, hear it, taste it, or
    smell it, directly or indirectly?

 2. Does it, has it, or could it exist in a particular
    place and time?

 3. Does it have causal interactions (in Aristotle's
    terms, efficient causes) with other physical
    things and events?
    
Besides not being physical (i.e., having negative
answers to the above questions), abstract entities
have affirmative answers to the following questions:

 1. Can it have physical replicas, embodiments,
    instances, encodings, or whatever similar
    term you would prefer to use?

 2. If you are given a physical replica of an abstraction
    at one place and time, can you transmit it (the
    abstraction, not the replica) at the speed of light
    to another place and time where another physical
    replica, sufficiently similar to the original by
    whatever criteria you choose, can be reconstructed?

I also emphasize that both physical objects (i.e.
continuants) and processes (i.e., occurrents) can be
replicas, embodiments, or instances of abstract
entities.  I use the term Schema for the abstraction
of a continuant and the term Script for the abstraction
of an occurrent.  (Nicola has complained of my shorthand
term "abstract occurrent" so I now call a script an
abstraction of an occurrent.)

I would also add, in parentheses, a comment that all
abstract entities are of the same nature as Plato's forms
or mathematical structures of which sets are one rather
simple example.  I would also add, in a double layer of
parentheses, that these entities can be, in Aristotle's
terms, a formal cause, but not an efficient cause.

Finally, I want to point out that I use the categories
Abstract and Physical to replace the older notions of
Universal and Particular.  Those were useful notions
when Aristotle introduced them (by other names), but
over the centuries, too many confused and ill-conceived
conceptions have become associated with them.

As just one example, I would cite the Dolce notion
of "abstract particular" as an example of a confused
and confusing conception.  I realize that they have
introduced ways of qualifying the confusion, but it's
better to avoid the confusion by picking a better
name to begin with.

John